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Twenty years after “the Confucian among philosophers, the philosopher among
Confucians”1 passed away in 1995, Jason Clower presents a selection of English
translations of texts by Mou Zongsan (1909–1995). “If twentieth-century China
produced a philosopher of the first rank,” Clower opens his introduction, “it was
Mou Zongsan” (p. 1). On the one hand, there can be no doubt about Mou’s
deeply ingrained Confucianism, and his work bespeaks his familiarity with
much of the philosophical heritage of both China and the occident – especially
its Ango-American, but also Graeco-Roman and German compartments.
However, people like Yu Yingshi 余英時, Lin Anwu 林安梧,2 but also mainland-
based scholars like Jiang Qing 蔣慶 have criticised Mou for exiling Confucianism
into the ivory tower of philosophical speculation, largely disregarding its societal
and institutional aspects and their potential relevance for present day China.
Likewise, Mou’s exceptional status as a philosopher, suggested by Clower and
claimed by many of his students and convinced readers, remains controversial.3
What is beyond contention, however, is that Mou was not only an erudite and
polymath, but also an extremely prolific writer. His studies penetrate the remotest
confines of Chinese intellectual history and his collected works comprise several
thousand pages in 32 volumes.4 In the course of the last two decades, Mou
1 This is how Cai Renhou, one of Mou’s most prominent students and professor emeritus at
Tunghai University in Taichung, has characterised Mou in his obituary (Lehmann 1998: 197).
2 For a short overview in English see Makeham 2008: 176–180.
3 Lee Ming-Huei, another of Mou’s students, at one point praises his teacher’s “philosophical
genius” (Lee 2001: 65). This enthusiasm is not restricted to Mou’s immediate students: In a
recent study based on her PhD thesis, N. Serina Chan at least twice asserts Mou’s theoretical
“genius” (Chan 2011: 116, 186). On the other extreme of the scale, there are people like Stephan
Schmidt who with respect to Mou’s claim that his moral metaphysics has sublated (aufgehoben)
“the vastly different dualisms” discussed by Mou states that “this is unpersuasive to the point of
caricature” (Schmidt 2011: 272).
4 Mou’s complete works were published by Linking Press in 2003.
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Zongsan has become one of the most widely studied twentieth century thinkers
in the Chinese speaking world: A full-text search for Mou’s name in the mainland-
based China Academic Journals Full-text Database yields an impressive amount of
9,452 hits.5
In contrast, there have been only a few book-length studies dedicated to
Mou in Western languages, in spite of a growing interest in his work. Among the
handful of books dealing with Mou’s thought, a considerable share of three
monographs have appeared in Brill’s Modern Chinese Philosophy series6 – the
very series which not only includes the anthology under discussion, but whose
second installment is Clower’s own The Unlikely Buddhologist published in 2011.
This book is based on his doctoral dissertation (Harvard 2008) and expounds
Mou’s work on Chinese Buddhism and its significance for his philosophical
thought. Given Mou’s prominence it is surprising that, so far, only a single
one of his dozens of works seems to be available in any Western language.7
According to the dustjacket blurb, the collection of essays selected, translated
and commented by Jason Clower is the very first printed publication of texts by
Mou in English translation ever. It thus doubtless meets a long-standing
desideratum.
Mou Zongsan has designated his philosophy by the term “moral metaphy-
sics”. His philosophical systematisation of Confucianism not least was aimed at
reconstructing the history of Chinese philosophy from a distinctively Confucian
perspective. Identifying a specifically Confucian notion of “moral autonomy” as
the core of Chinese thought, Mou has chosen Kant’s term of “intellektuelle
Anschauung” (intellectual intuition), or, more precisely, his own Chinese transla-
tion of it, zhi de zhijue (智的直覺), literally “immediate awareness of wisdom”, to
refer to the kind of intuitive experience of morality that is allegedly testified in the
writings of traditional Neo-Confucians. For him, this practical spiritual experience
marks the lynchpin of Neo-Confucian discussions about personal cultivation.
However, the “loftiest and most profound question in philosophy” (p. 103), the
problem of the “perfect teaching” (yuanjiao圓教), Mou finds discussed in Chinese
Buddhist scholastics. The notion of the “perfect teaching” is pivotal for Mou’s
reinterpretation of the concept of the summum bonum (yuanshan 圓善) which in
turn marks the very core of his philosophy. Due to the diversity of his intellectual
5 China Academic Journals Fulltext Database, http://oversea.cnki.net/kns55/brief/result.aspx
(18/08/2015).
6 Clower 2010, Chan 2011, Billioud 2011. The series was established in 2010. It is edited by John
Makeham.
7 In 2003, Kamenarović and Pastor have published a French translation of Mou Zongsan’s
Zhongguo zhexue de tezhi (The Peculiarity of Chinese Philosophy, Chinese original 1962).
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references, Mou in his writings rather liberally combines and interrelates technical
terms and concepts from traditions as distant and diverse from each other
as Kantian transcendentalism, the Neo-Confucian “teaching of the heart-mind”
(xinxue 心學), and Buddhist Tiantai scholastics, to name but the most prominent
cardinal points of his philosophical universe (cf. also p. 6). Clower, who is familiar
with the sprawling intellectual edifices of Chinese Buddhist scholastics which
prove at least as important as Neo-Confucian ethics or Kantian idealism
for unravelling the intricate theoretical constructions of Mou’s philosophy, is
thus excellently prepared for mastering the challenging task of translating
Mou’s multifaceted and – at least in part – theoretically highly ambitious
texts into English.
In view of the sheer diversity of Mou’s intellectual references and the
complexity of his work, the very fact that Clower has succeeded to provide a
faithful and highly readable translation without lapsing into technical jargon
is admirable in itself. As Clower observes, it is not so much the complexity of
Mou’s argumentation which sometimes renders his texts extremely difficult,
but rather his tendency to renounce on making his claims more explicit (p. 24).
In his interpretation and reconstruction of Chinese philosophy, the need for
devising detailed arguments for his specific views on particular problems
apparently seemed less urgent to him than the encyclopaedic obligation to
cover all relevant developments in China’s intellectual history. Mou’s termino-
logical idiosyncrasies along with the recurrent lack of explicitness in decisive
passages of his works have provoked highly controversial assessments of
his philosophical references, most obviously so with respect to Kant.8 In this
context it reads like a caveat against underestimating Mou’s familiarity
with Kantianism, when Clower relates a case where his understanding of
Mou’s use of the recognisably Buddhist term xiang (相 “distinctive mark”)
profited from taking into account the Kantian implications suggested by
Mou’s glosses (pp. 216–217).
Clower starts his introduction (pp. 1–27) with a concise portray of Mou Zongsan
and his time. He explains his selection of essays and highlights the most important
aspects of Mou’s thought as they emerge in the anthology. His compilation of
essays aims to gather texts of a general significance for understanding the major
8 Thus Lee Ming-Huei characterises Mou’s work as an “immanent critique” of Kant’s philoso-
phy directly inspired by a number of systematic difficulties with Kant’s thought (Lee 2001: 65).
Hans-Rudolf Kantor claims a Kantian perspective and judges Mou’s adoption of Kantian
transcendentalism as outright revisionist (Kantor 1999: 438, 443, 451). Schmidt holds that,
from within a Kantian frame of reference, Mou’s claim that man can have intellectual intuition
“can only strike one as silly” (Schmidt 2011: 268).
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tenets of Mou’s thought, although Clower admits that his choice clearly reflects his
personal interest in the Buddhist-Confucian relationship (p. 5). Many of the essays
included are based on lectures addressed to a general public, as they make “more
concessions to clarity than usual” (p. 6). Clower’s consideration of Buddhist influ-
ences on Mou’s thought makes this selection of essays especially valuable, as it
focuses on an aspect of Mou’s work which, compared to Mou’s studies on Neo-
Confucianism and his work on Kant, is still underrepresented in the growing
literature on Mou’s thinking.9
Clower arranges Mou’s essays in three loosely defined topical groups dedi-
cated to the future of Chinese philosophy, its methodology and problems, and
its history, respectively (p. 7).
The first part, “The Future of Chinese Philosophy” (ch. 1–3), gathers three
essays by Mou composed between 1990 and 1992. In “Objective Understanding
and the Remaking of Chinese Culture” (ch. 1, pp. 31–60), a keynote address at
the first International Conference on New Confucianism in 1990, Mou relates his
call for a Confucian revival of Chinese culture with an acerbic complaint about
the paltry level of scholarship in twentieth century China. He criticises some of
the intellectual giants of the Republican period, both his adversaries like Hu
Shi 胡適 (1891–1962) and Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895–1990) and his Confucian
comrades-in-spirit Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) and Xiong Shili 熊十力
(1885–1968). In Mou’s view, their common failure was their lack in what he calls
“objective learning”. This concept appears to be related to the comprehensive-
ness and factual accuracy of one’s studies, but also to scholarly impartiality
and moral steadfastness. However, the significance of this term appears rather
elusive and the concept remains pale, not least in contrast to Mou’s harsh
judgements on most of his colleagues. Although this text stays rather vague
philosophically, its placement at the very beginning of the anthology is none-
theless a convincing editorial decision: It presents Mou’s personal view back
on the formative period of his thought in his younger years and thus resumes the
introduction topically, complementing it with his subjective perspective on the
intellectual world of Republican China. Chapter 2, “The Chinese Idea of Settling
Oneself and Establishing One’s Destiny” (pp. 61–69, 1991), revolves around
Mencius’s notion of “establishing one’s fate” (li ming 立命) and emphasises
the crucial role of rationality and of people’s immanent morality for a successful
9 This is true in spite of Hans-Rudolf Kantor’s work on Mou’s studies on Tiantai-Buddhism
(Kantor 1999, 2006), Clower’s own publications on the topic (Clower 2010, 2011), and a special
forum on Mou Zongsan and Buddhism in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy (vol. 38, 2nd issue)
published in 2011.
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modernisation of China. In “Meeting at Goose Lake – The Great Synthesis in
the Development of Chinese Culture and the Merging of Chinese and Western
Tradition” (ch. 3, pp. 70–87), Mou’s keynote speech to the second International
Conference on New Confucianism in 1992, Mou, encouraged by the withdrawal
of Marxist-Leninist materialism from academic discourse in the People’s
Republic, conjures the imminent realisation of a new “idealism” (p. 77) combin-
ing a Chinese-style “mind-only theory” (weixinlun 唯心論) with Western
philosophy (p. 83).
The second part of the anthology, dedicated to concepts and problems of
Chinese philosophy (ch. 4–6), starts with “Philosophy and the Perfect
Teaching” (ch. 4; pp. 91–94), a short discussion of the Buddhist notion of the
“perfect teaching” which is pivotal for Mou’s project of synthesising Chinese
and Western philosophy. Heading straight towards the problem of the highest
good – the core of his moral metaphysics (p. 91) –, Mou bemoans the alleged
theoretical slant of modern European and in particular Anglo-American philo-
sophy and contrasts this to the ancient Greek model of philosophy with its
pursuit for the good life. As Mou sees it, the Chinese “teachings” of
Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism represent practical attempts to realise
precisely this ultimate goal of philosophy. The outline of Mou’s Confucian
critique of the Kantian conceptualisation of the highest good closing this
essay shows both the purpose and the philosophical limits of Mou’s endeavour
(pp. 92–94). Chapter 5, “Ten Great Doctrinal Disputes in the Development of
Chinese Culture” (pp. 95–113), presents Mou’s peculiar perspective on China’s
intellectual history. The reason why Clower includes this sketch of Mou’s view
on the history of Chinese philosophy is the rationale structuring his presenta-
tion: For Mou, Chinese intellectual history revolves around a notion of moral
self-cultivation that leads, through the centuries, to an ever increasing aware-
ness of the alleged core of Chinese thought. Mou chooses to present this
growing insight into the purported essence of human nature as a series of
intellectual disputes each of which marks a decisive advancement towards
what Mou regards as a full-fledged notion of moral autonomy. When he
eventually arrives at what he considers the pressing conflict of his own time,
it becomes evident just how tightly this view on the intellectual past of China is
entwined with Mou’s culturalist agenda for its present: The last dispute
included is nothing less than the fight between the irreconcilable antipodes
of Communism and Chinese culture. “Transcendental Analysis and Dialectical
Synthesis”, given as a keynote speech at a conference of East-West compara-
tive philosophy in 1993, forms chapter 6 (pp. 114–122) of the collection. Mou
here delineates his own understanding of dialectics as a peculiar method of
spiritual cultivation that leads to a higher state through contradictions (p. 114).
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He deplores the weakness of Hegel’s notion of dialectics which he considers as
a conflation of the processes of thinking and being. This in fact is nothing less
than Hegel’s original sin in philosophy, as from here, there is a straight line to
Marx and to the calamities of twentieth century China (pp. 118–119). One
serious consequence of Mou’s revision of Hegelian dialectics, inadvertent or
not, is the disposal of the latter’s crucial insight that the subject and its
consciousness are the outcome of a real historical process. True, without the
possibility to reach the eventual aim of the dialectics of liberation – the
ultimate state of freedom and equality of all human beings – Hegelian dialec-
tics loses its potential to conceive of an end of the struggle for freedom.
Still, Hegel speaks about historical subjects, individuals who fight for their
freedom. It is precisely this struggle which is thought to drive history ahead, a
rationale Mou simply chooses to ignore. In stark contrast to Hegel’s concept,
Mou’s “spiritual dialectics” moreover leads the individual practitioner of self-
cultivation to find peace in his insight that, in spite of all the hardship and
injustice in this world, he is, on a more fundamental level, “complete here and
now” (p. 121). Mou’s attempt to “avoid” the catastrophes provoked by the
untameable struggle for freedom thus not only forsakes the theoretical punch-
line of Hegelian dialectics, it also replaces real liberation with the merely
spiritual freedom of inner consolation.
The third part of the collection, “History of Chinese Philosophy” (ch. 7–10),
gathers a series of texts considerably older than those presented in the first two
parts. Chapter 7, “Confucian Moral Metaphysics” (pp. 125–144), was originally
published in 1975 and presents Mou’s particular view on Confucianism with its
strong emphasis on the “teaching of the heart-mind” (xinxue 心學). The promi-
nence of this variant of imperial Neo-Confucianism results from Mou’s decision
to assess the philosophical value of Neo-Confucian teachings on the basis of the
criterion of whether they acknowledge a priority of practical over theoretical
reason. For him, the most mature expression of such a prioritisation is the
identification of “mind” (xin 心) and “reason” (li 理) which he somewhat dar-
ingly identifies with the Kantian concepts of conscience and moral law: On this
rationale, Kant himself fares better than Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), but is far
behind Mencius (tr. 372–289 BC), Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–1192) or Wang
Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) (p. 131). Unlike Zhu Xi, Kant is said to have
recognised the priority of practical over theoretical reason: But his conception
of the connection of free will and moral law for Mou is inferior to that of
the proponents of xinxue, as it fails to account for a principium executionis
of the moral law. This essay thus nicely illustrates how deeply Mou’s interpreta-
tion and assessment of traditional Chinese thinkers is soaked with
Kantian ethics – even if the precise relation between Kantian and Confucian
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terms is often left implicit and rather results from what Stephan Schmidt has
characterised as a hermeneutic strategy of “translation qua equalisation”.10
Chapter 8, entitled “Three Lineages of Song-Ming Confucianism” (pp. 145–175),
also deals with Mou’s reappraisal of imperial Neo-Confucianism which results
in his refutation of Zhu Xi’s and Cheng Yi’s程頤 (1033–1107) orthodox status due
to their alleged failure to appreciate the concrete and creative-cum-practical
rather than abstract and theoretical character of the Confucian Way. Chapter
9, “The Rise of Buddhist Learning in the Northern and Southern Dynasties, Sui,
and Tang” (pp. 176–199), is Mou’s first lecture in a course on Mediaeval
Buddhism held in 1976–1977. In spite of its title, this essay is mainly an excur-
sion through the intellectual history of China from the early imperial era to
the twentieth century. Mou seizes the opportunity to present his highly proble-
matic assessment of Qing evidential scholarship according to which there is a
straight line from evidential scholarship to the positivist intellectual climate of
twentieth century China that allegedly prepared the ground for the rise of
the Communist Party. Mou fails to substantiate this claim, and the only com-
monality between evidential scholarship and the intellectual atmosphere of
twentieth century China seems to be the tendency – equally dangerous and
contemptible in Mou’s view – to detach erudition from spiritual cultivation.
Chapter 10, “The Place of the Tiantai Tradition in Chinese Buddhism”
(pp. 201–211), contains a discussion of the concepts of “discriminating” (fenbie
de 分別的) and “non-discriminating” (fei fenbie de 非分別 的) explanation
which are indispensable for understanding the Tiantai conception of a “perfect
teaching” so crucial for Mou’s own philosophy.
In a separate appendix (pp. 213–224), Clower eventually provides a transla-
tion of one of the more arcane passages of Mou’s 1975 Phenomenon and Thing-in-
Itself (translated by Clower as “Appearance and Thing-in-Itself”, see p. 213).
It deals with the self-negation of the moral heart-mind and its subsequent
transformation into object-oriented understanding. This shows that Clower
does not shy away from Mou’s more difficult and problematic texts. It is not
only the highly figurative and fleeting language which renders this core piece of
Mou’s philosophy so difficult. Not least, it illustrates the extent to which Mou’s
thought is entrenched in a kind of metaphysical speculation which tends to
remain as opaque as it is likely to alienate many modern academic readers.
According to the present reviewer, Mou’s figure of a self-negating infinite cosmic
consciousness marks the point where the limits of his essentialist culturalism
surface most blatantly. This emerges if one relates it to one of the most striking
features of Mou’s thought: his obstinate anti-Communism.
10 Schmidt 2011: 264.
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At one point, Mou claims that “my disgust for Marx is not a bias but a true
inability to appreciate him” (p. 53). However, Mou’s refusal of Communism strikes
one as extremely emotional and hardly ever argued for. Polemically put, there
appears to be a hefty dose of irrationality in play here: “Communism is a demonic
heresy and should be thoroughly eradicated” (p. 112), and “Mao Zedong was a
great devil” (p. 119). Again, in view of the political catastrophes in the aftermath of
the Communist seizure of power one can understand Mou’s fervent anti-commun-
ism. Still, it is rather surprising that a thinker of his format and with his
obsession with the problem of the Modern decided simply to ignore the
theoretical aspects of Marx’s critique of capitalist modernity. Mou’s negligence
of non-spiritual factors in the course of history is most strikingly reflected in
his exaltation of “moral knowing” which at one point he characterises as
follows: “The expression of moral knowing on the spot as filiality and rever-
ence for elders and love is something that issues forth in response to circum-
stances, and the mind that is expressed is an absolute one” (p. 166). This kind
of instantaneous moral knowing is precisely what according to Mou is realised
in intellectual intuition: As soon as I stand face to face with my parents, I not
only suddenly and intuitively know how to act correctly but I cannot but
realise adequate filial behaviour. Mou thus essentialises morality and defines
as human nature a set of social norms of interpersonal relationships. Turning
into “anthropological constants”, moral norms are here elevated above the
merely accidental course of history and unhinged from their connection to the
conditions of particular forms of society. With Mou, the absolute moral mind
which warrants the eternal validity of moral norms has the power consciously
to negate itself and to provide the conditions for establishing a Chinese
modernity which has science and democracy and all the other desirable
ingredients of a modern society. Such unswerving confidence and solemn
elation almost unwittingly invokes Marx’s and Engels’s wake-up call in the
Communist Manifesto: In capitalist modernity, a definite end is put to all
feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. The motley of ties that bound man to
his “natural superiors” is torn asunder, what used to be holy is profaned. To be
sure, the rhetorical pathos of the Manifesto itself may today appear as out-
dated as some of Mou’s moralistic and metaphysical musings. Yet, however
moot Marx’s and Engels’s own analysis of the dynamics of modernisation may
prove, it could still have alarmed Mou that Hegelian and Marxian historical
dialectics after all might be more than mere fanatic devilry resulting from a
cataclysmal category error. Mou’s culturalism and moralism at any rate seem a
rather unconvincing response to the impositions of modernity – and one
suspects that he might have profited from taking intellectually more serious
his most passionately abhorred enemy.
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Clower’s selection of essays by Mou Zongsan is an excellent introduction
into the intellectual world of one of the most influential thinkers of China’s
twentieth century. The essays chosen are very different in character, but their
arrangement is well-considered and in their entirety they yield a representative
and detailed picture of Mou’s vision of Chinese philosophy. Anyone interested in
the history of New Confucianism and in the intellectual history of twentieth
century China in general will profit from reading this book. The book includes a
helpful index which facilitates the reader’s orientation, and numerous notes
ensure that it is also accessible to a broader public.
Late Works of Mou Zongsan doubtless is an impressive proof of Mou’s
erudition. Whether Mou is the philosopher of first rank suggested by Clower is
likely to remain controversial also among future readers of this anthology.
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